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LEGAL ETHICS-THE QUESTION OF Ex PARTE COMMUNICA­
TIONS AND PRO SE LAWYERS UNDER MODEL RULE 4.2-HEy, 
CAN WE TALK? 
INTRODUcnON 
Under Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") 
Rule 4.2 and Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model 
Code") DR 7-104(A)(1),1 ex parte communications2 between law­
yers and represented parties is prohibited. While this ethical tenet 
proscribing ex parte contact is easily applied to lawyers represent­
ing opposing parties, application of this principal is difficult at best 
when lawyers appear pro se.3 Because pro se lawyers act on behalf 
of their own interests, questions arise as to whether pro se attorneys 
are subject to the prohibitions against ex parte communications.4 
1. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUcr ("MODEL RULES") Rule 4.2 
(1996). 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of 
the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by an­
other lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other 
lawyer or is authorized by law to do so. 
Id.; see also MODEL CoDE OF PROFEssIONAL REsPONsmILITY ("MODEL CoDE") DR 7­
l04(A)(l) (1996). 
During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not: 
[c]ommunicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the repre­
sentation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter 
unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or 
is authorized by law to do so. 
Id. 
2. Ex parte communications mean "contact between [lawyers] and [opposing par­
ties] outside the presence of that party's counsel." S. Blake Parrish, Jr., Note, Public 
Service Electric & Gas Co. v. Associated Electric & Gas Ins. Serv., Ltd.: An Expansive 
View of Rule 4.2 and Ex Parte Contacts with Former Employees, 1991 UTAH L. REv. 
647,647 n.1 (1991). The term ex parte is defined as "by or for one party, done for, in 
behalf of, or on the application of, one party only." BLACK'S LAw DIcrIONARY 576 
(6th ed. 1990). 
3. The term pro se is defined as "[f]or one's own behalf; in person. Appearing for 
oneself, as in the case of one who does not retain a lawyer and appears for himself in 
court." BLACK'S LAw DIcrIONARY 1221 (6th ed. 1990). 
4. See, e.g., Alicia L. Downey, Note, Fools and Their Ethics: The Professional 
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Lawyers have the same right to self-representation as non-Iaw­
yers.5 Indeed, lawyers have exercised this right in many types of 
cases.6 According to the Model Rules, however, lawyers are repre­
sentatives of clients, officers of the court, and public citizens having 
unique responsibilities to the quality of justice.' Unlike non-attor­
ney pro se litigants, lawyers have professional obligations to obey 
specific ethical standards.8 Pro se lawyers may invariably violate 
professional responsibilities when acting on behalf of their own in­
terests.9 Hence, there exist conflicts between lawyers' right to pro-
Responsibility of Pro Se Attorneys, 34 B.C. L. REv. 529 (1993). Downey discusses the 
general uncertainty of the applicability of disciplinary rules to pro se lawyers whereas 
this Note examines the applicability of a specific rule to pro se attorneys. Her Note 
provides an excellent source of background material concerning the application of ethi­
cal rules to pro se attorneys. This Note relies heavily on Downey's substantive effort 
and argument that pro se lawyers should be governed by appropriate ethical standards, 
e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 4.2 should apply to pro se attorneys under most circum­
stances, and points the researcher to Downey's Note for additional or further research 
and citations. 
5. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL Enncs§ 14.4 (1986); see also 
Downey, supra note 4, at 530, 533-35 for a detailed discussion on the history of attor­
neys' right to self-representation. 
Downey explains that the right to appear pro se is rooted in American history and 
law, dating back to colonial America. See Downey, supra note 4, at 533. The colonists 
held in high regard "the virtues of self-reliance and a traditional distrust of lawyers." 
Faretta v. California,422 U.S. 806, 826-32 (1975); see also Robert H. Abrams & Donald 
J. Dunn, The Law Library's Institutional Response to the Pro Se Patron: A Post-Faretta 
Review, 1 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 47 (1978) (describing how law libraries can help pro se 
litigants achieve effective self-representation in light of Faretta). 
Congress passed legislation in 1789 protecting a litigant's right to appear in federal 
court without a lawyer. See Downey, supra note 4, at 534 (citing WOLFRAM, at § 14.4. 
Present version of statute at 28 U.S.c. § 1654 (1994) ("In all courts of the United States 
the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally ...."». A majority of 
state constitutions have guaranteed the right of self-representation or have impliedly 
guaranteed that right by allowing open access to courts for redress of civil grievances. 
See Downey, supra note 4, at 534 (citing Helen B. Kim, Legal Education for the Pro Se 
Litigant: A Step TowardS a Meaningful Right to be Heard, 96 YALE L.J. 1641, 1641 n.2 
(1987». 
6. See Downey, supra note 4, at 530 n.16 (citing Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 
(1991) (civil rights claim); Fox v. Boucher, 794 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1986) (tort claim); White 
v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 614 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1980) (action against creditor 
under 1h1th in Lending Act); Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1958) (crim­
inal defense); Falcone v. IRS, 479 F. Supp. 985 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (action against gov­
ernment under Freedom of Information Act); Presnick v. Esposito, 513 A.2d 165 
(Conn. App. 1986) (action against client for fee non-payment». 
7. See generally MODEL RULES Preamble. 
8. See MODEL RULES; MODEL CoDE. See infra Part I.B for a discussion of the 
specific ethical obligations imposed upon lawyers. 
9. See supra note 6 and cases cited therein for examples of improper pro se attor­
ney conduct. 
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ceed pro se and their ethical obligations to the legal process and 
system. . 
Unfortunately, the rules governing attorney conduct are silent 
concerning the ethics of attorney self-representation.lO Both DR 7­
l04(A)(l) and Rule 4.2 seem to assume the existence of attorney­
client relationships between separate individuals.H The rules do 
not answer whether pro se lawyers act in representative capacities 
of "clients." Moreover, whether Rule 4.2 applies to pro se attor­
neys is left unanswered by various court interpretations.12 Hence, it 
is not clear whether Rule 4.2 governs pro se attorneys engaged in ex 
parte communications. 
This Note examines the uncertainty and confusion surrounding 
the applicability of ex parte standards to pro se lawyers. Part I.A 
reviews the development and evolution of current ex parte rules.13 
Part I.B discusses how the ethical standards of objectivity, re­
fraining from harassment, and avoiding the appearance of impro­
priety govern lawyers' professional responsibilities to courts and 
society.14 Although pro se attorneys are entitled to self-representa­
tion, Part II examines whether pro se attorneys should be subject to 
the same ethical concems as other attorneys to maintain profes­
sional standards while prom()ting the integrity of the legal 
profession.1s 
In conclusion, this Note advocates the adoption of a rebuttable 
presumption that pro se attorneys violate Rule 4.2 when engaging 
in unauthorized ex parte communications.16 The presumption is re­
10. See Downey, supra note 4, at 532. See also Brett Barenholtz, Note, Fees for 
the Taxpaying FooL· IRC Section 7430 Fee Awards to Pro Se Attorneys, 38 CASE W. REs. 
L. REv. 408,440 n.225 (1988) (ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility is silent 
concerning the general applicability of rules to attorney self-representation). 
11. Rule 4.2 states that "[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate 
... with a person ... represented by another lawyer." MODEL RULES Rule 4.2. (empha­
sis added); see also MODEL CoDE DR 7-104(A)(I). "During the course of his represen­
tation of a client a lawyer shall not" engage in ex parte communication. Id. (emphasis 
added). See supra note 1 for the complete text of both rules. 
12. See, e.g., Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103, 108-09 (Wyo. 1994) (lawyer­
husband proceeding pro se may not contact wife directly); Pinsky v. Statewide Griev­
ance Comm., 578 A.2d 1075, 1079 (Conn. 1990) (lawyer acting on own behalf not "rep­
resenting a client" and therefore did not violate ethical duties when contacting 
represented opponent); In re Segall, 509 N.E.2d 988, 990 (Ill. 1987) ("[A]ttorney who is 
himself a party to the litigation represents himself when he contacts an opposing 
party."). 
13. See infra notes 29-112 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra notes 113-186 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra notes 187-242 and accompanying text. 
16. See, e.g., CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmlLITY, AMERICAN BAR As­
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butted when attorneys demonstrate that their conduct otherwise 
satisfies the ethical obligations imposed by the Model Rules.17 This 
proposed framework recognizes the problems inherent in pro se ex 
parte communications that mandate the protection afforded by 
Rule 4.2 while also acknowledging that certain pro se ex parte com­
munications may be made by attorneys in manners that do not im­
plicate the concerns for which Rule 4.2 was initially promulgated. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The litigiousness of Americans is growing at an explosive 
rate.18 The cost of hiring lawyers is also rising.19 Consequently, 
more litigants are representing themselves.20 The growth of pro se 
litigation implicates several concerns, such as pro se litigants' lack 
of knowledge of law and proper court procedure. Additionally, pro 
se litigants are apt to file frivolous actions and abuse the legal pro­
cess to harass others.21 
While general problems of pro se litigation have been studied, 
commentators have not afforded as much attention to pro se liti­
gants who are also lawyers.22 Lawyers can subject the legal system 
SOCIATION, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuer 402 (3d ed. 1996) 
(citing D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 258 (1995) (pro se lawyers are prohibited 
from contacting represented opponents; pro se lawyers bring professional skill and legal 
knowledge to the table and retain presumptively unfair advantage over opposing 
parties». 
17. See infra note 210 for a discussion of how pro se lawyers can protect them­
selves from false claims of Rule 4.2 violations. See also infra note 210 for an explana­
tion of why this Note's rebuttable presumption standard does not lead to an absolute 
bar against attorney self-representation in practice. 
18. See, e.g., Amy Stevens, Self-Representation in Court Can Save Money but 
Often at the Cost of Success, WALL ST. J., June 3,1991, at B1. 
19. See id. 
20. See id. See also Jene Stonesifer, Going to Court for Child Support; Many Are 
Opting for Self-Representation, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1992, at 05. 
21. See Joseph M. McLaughlin, Note, An Extension of the Right of Access: The 
Pro Se Litigant's Right to Notification of the Requirements of the Summary Judgment 
Rule, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 1109, 1109 n.4 (1987); see also Alafair S.R. Burke, Recon­
ciling Professional Ethics and Prosecutorilll Power: The No-Contact Rule Debate, 46 
STAN. L. REv. 1635, 1639 (1994) (ex parte prohibitions are designed to address "imbal­
ances in knowledge and skill between lawyers and adverse parties" by prohibiting law­
yers from using superior legal knowledge and skills to manipulate laypersons); Eric J.R. 
Nichols, Note, Preserving Pro Se Representation in an Age ofRule 11 Sanctions, 67 TEx. 
L. REv. 351, 351 n.3 (1988) (listing cases in which pro se litigants harassed opponents 
and wasted court resources). 
22. For articles discussing the general right to appear pro se, see, e.g., Frank A. 
Kaufman, The Right ofSelf-Representation and the Power ofJury Nullification, 28 CASE 
W. REs. L. REv. 269 n.2 (1978) (citing Ira P. Robbins & Susan N. Herman, Pro Se 
Litigation-Litigating Without Counsel: Faretta or For Worse, 42 BROOK. L. REv. 629 
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to the same abuses as non-Iawyers.23 Unusual problems may arise 
when "[s]uch abuses ... [are] perpetrated by pro se attorneys, be­
cause attorneys have [professional duties] to conform to certain . 
ethical standards."24 These standards mandate that lawyers exer­
cise legal objectivity, refrain from using the legal process to harass 
others, and avoid the appearance of impropriety.2S 
Lawyers who ignore and violate these standards invariably vio­
late provisions of the Model Code or Model Rules.26 Unfortu­
nately, the Model Rules and Model Code do not address attorney 
(1976); David Rosenberg, Self-Representation and the Crimilulily Accused-Evolution 
and Scope in the Federal Courts, 13 CAL. W. L. REv. 269 (1976); Steven Sarfatti, Recent 
Development, Crimilull Defendimts at the Bar of Their Own Defense, 13 AM. CRIM. L. 
REv. 335 (1975); Kathleen Smyth Cook, Comment, Faretta v. California: An examina­
tion of Its Procedural Deficiencies, 7 CoLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 553 (1975-76); Phil 
Miller, Note, Faretta v. California: The Law Helps Those Who Help Themselves, 28 
HAsTINGS LJ. 283 (1976); Marlee S. Myers, Note, A Fool for a Client: The Supreme 
Court Rules on the Pro Se Right, 37 U. Prrr. L. REv. 403 (1975); Note, The Jailed Pro Se 
Defendant and the Right to Prepare a Defense, 86 YALE LJ. 292 (1976». But see Dow­
ney, supra note 4, at 530. Downey's Note is a comprehensive examination of the appli­
cability of ethical rules to attorney self-representation. 
23. See Downey, supra note 4, at 531 n.17. Downey cites Schild v. Rubin, 232 
Cal. App. 3d 755 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). In Schild, two neighbors, both attorneys, 
brought actions against each other in a dispute over backyard basketball playing. 
Rubin was annoyed by the sound of the Schild family playing basketball in the after­
noon. See Schild, 232 Cal. App. 3d at 758. In observing the harm to the legal system 
caused by these self-representing attorneys, the court of appeals quoted the trial court: 
[W]hat we have [are] lawyers utilizing their own unlimited resources to accel­
erate petty neighborhood squabbles into a community war. You have even 
involved your neighbors, and you have in that manner disturbed the tranquil­
ity of a whole neighborhood, people taking sides, one against the other.... It 
appears to the Court and to the community . . . that the lawyers here are 
abusing the limited resources of the Court, which has a myriad of truly difficult 
matters pending before it .... You have by your conduct and by your position 
as lawyers embarrassed the Bar and the judicial system as a whole. You have 
subjected the whole system to ridicule and public scorn. And many people, 
[including] your fellow practitioners, I believe would find this kind of conduct 
intolerable. 
Id. at 761 n.2; see also Downey, supra note 4, at 531 n.17 for a detailed discussion of this 
case. 
24. Downey, supra note 4, at 531 (footnote omitted); see also MODEL RULES 
Preamble. 
25. See MODEL RULES Scope ("The Rules are thus partly obligatory and discipli­
nary and partly constitutive and descriptive in that they define a lawyer's professional 
role."); WOLFRAM, supra note 5, at §§ 1.1 (lawyers and public distrust), 10.2.1 (profes­
sional detachment), and 11.2 (lawyers and abusive litigation); Downey, supra note 4, at 
531-32 (citing AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER 
SANcrIONS ("ABA STANDARDS") Theoretical Framework (1986) (discussing lawyers' 
duties in relation to the Model Rules and Model Code». 
26. See Downey, supra note 4, at 532 (citing ABA STANDARDS Theoretical 
Framework; GEOFFREY C. HAzARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAw OF LAWYER­
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seH-representation and the applicability of sanctions for violating 
professional ethical standards by pro seattorneys.27 Indeed, "[t]he 
lack of clarity in [ethical] rules [ ] and the inconsistent application of 
them allows attorneys to practice loophole lawyering and evade 
ethical standards."28 Accordingly, the policy considerations behind 
Rule 4.2 must be considered in order to determine whether ex parte 
proscriptions apply to pro se lawyers. 
A. The Development and Application of Ex Parte Prohibition 
The design of Rule 4.2 prevents lawyers from taking advantage 
of uncounselled laypersons. Moreover, Rule 4.2 provides protec­
tion to represented persons from overreaching by adverse counsel. 
Hence, Rule 4.2 aspires to preserve the integrity of lawyer-client 
relationships as well as preserve the proper functioning of the judi­
cial system.29 Unfortunately, whether Rule 4.2 applies to pro se at­
torneys remains uncertain. 
1. The Purpose for Ex Parte Proscriptions 
The ABA asserts several reasons why lawyers' ex parte com­
munications with represented parties should be restricted. In 1934, 
the ABA originally stated that the prohibition against ex parte com­
munications proposed '''[t]o preserve the proper functioning of the 
legal profession as well as to shield the adverse party from im­
proper approaches. "'30 The ban on ex parte communication also 
serves to prevent opposing lawyers from "unfairly obtaining infor-
ING: A HANDBOOK ON 1HE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuer § 104 (2d ed. 
1990 & Supp. 1991». 
27. See Barenholtz, supra note 10, at 440 n.225 (Model Code is silent regarding 
attorney self-representation); Downey, supra note 4, at 532. 
28. David A. Green, Balancing Ethical Concerns Against Liberal Discovery: The 
Case ofRule 4.2 and the Problem ofLoophole Lawyering, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 283, 
287 (1995). 
29. See generally Carter v. Kamaras, 430 A.2d 1058 (R.I. 1981). See also N. Lee 
Cooper, Courtesy Call· It Is Tune to Reverse the Decline of Civility in Our Justice Sys­
tem, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1997, at 8. Cooper declares that: 
Confidence in the American justice system begins with the public perception 
of lawyers. As attorneys, therefore, we must constantly ask what we have 
done to deserve a better public image. As part of that process, we must ask 
what we have done to help achieve a fairer, more trustworthy and reliable 
system of justice. 
Id. See infra Part I.B.3 for a discussion of attorney obligations to avoid the appearance 
of impropriety. 
30. Parrish, supra note 2, at 648 (quoting ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and 
Grievances, Formal Op. 108 (1934». Parrish notes that the ABA has reaffirmed this 
policy in subsequent opinions. See Parrish, supra note 2, at 648 n.10 (citing ABA 
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mation" from parties who are questioned outside the presence of 
their counsel,31 Moreover, courts note that the rules prevent "situa­
tions in which [represented parties] may be taken advantage of by 
adverse counsel. "32 
Similarly, Ethical Consideration ("EC") 7-18 of the Model 
Code provides: 
The legal system in its broadest sense functions best when per­
sons in need of legal advice or assistance are represented by their 
own counsel. For this reason [lawyers] should not communicate 
on the subject matter of the representation of [clients] with [per­
sons they know] to be represented in the matter by [other law­
yers], unless pursuant to law or rule of court or unless [they have] 
the consent of the [opposing lawyersJ.33 
The rules governing ex parte contact are designed to avoid "conver­
sations between a nonlawyer and an adverse lawyer [which might] 
lead to disputes about what was said, which may force the lawyer to 
become a witness."34 Attorneys acting as witnesses risk violating 
ethical rules governing conflicts of interest.35 Other justifications 
for ex parte prohibitions include: protecting clients from inadver­
tently disclosing privileged information, helping settle disputes 
through neutral experts, and avoiding the competing interests be­
tween a lawyer's duty to zealously represent his client and a law­
yer's duty not to abuse an unprotected party.36 
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Infonnal Op. 1498 (1983); ABA 
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Fonnal Op. 359 (1991». 
31. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Infonnal Op. 1498 
(1983); see also Parrish, supra note 2, at 649 n.ll (citing Samuel R. Miller & Angelo J. 
Caito, Ex Parte Contact with Employees and Former Employees of a Corporate Adver­
sary: Is It Ethical?, 42 Bus. LAW. 1053, 1054-55 (1987) (explaining the objectives of Rule 
4.2». 
32. Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564,567 (Wash. 1984) (en banc); see 
also Jon S. Herreman, Note, The Scope of the Disciplinary Rules Prohibiting Ex Parte 
Communication in a Corporate Context, 40 DRAKE L. REv. 861, 862-64 (1991). 
33. MODEL CoDE ETHICAL CoNSIDERATION ("EC") 7-18 (1996). 
34. John Leubsdorf, Communicating with Another Lawyer's Client· The Lawyer's 
Veto and the Client's Interests. 127 U. PA. L. REv. 683, 686 (1979). 
35. See, e.g., MODEL CoDE DR 5-101 (refusing employment when the interests of 
lawyers impair their independent professional judgment); DR 5-102 (withdrawing as 
counsel when lawyers become witnesses); MODEL RULES Rule 1.7 (conflict of interest); 
Rule 3.7 (lawyers as witnesses). 
36. See Lewis Kurlantzik, The Prohibition on Communication with an Adverse 
Party, 51 CoNN. B.J. 136, 145-46 (1977); see also Leubsdorf. supra note 34, at 686-87. 
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2. 	 The Uncertainty of Appropriately Applying Ex Parte 
Proscriptions 
Model Code DR 7-104(A)(1) and Model Rule 4.2 exhibit no 
substantive differences.37 The ABA, however, attempted to make 
the Model Rules easier to interpret and apply than the Model 
Code.38 The Model Code's "tripartite" format of Canons, Ethical 
Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules was replaced with black-let­
ter rules and comments in the nature of the American Law Insti­
tute's Restatements of LaW.39 The Comment to Rule 4.2 provides 
that "parties to a matter may communicate directly with each 
other."40 The Comment enumerates a significant exception to the 
general ex parte proscription in that Rule 4.2 does not apply to cli­
ents of lawyers. 
The ABA's Comment is an attempt to clarify the scope of Rule 
4.2. Ironically, however, the Comment contributes to the ambiguity 
surrounding Rule 4.2's application to pro se lawyers. Whether pro 
se lawyers are considered "parties to matters" and not governed by 
Rule 4.2's proscription is not answered by the Model Rules nor by 
the Model Code.41 Courts are unable to agree on whether pro se 
lawyers represent "clients" and thus are subject to ex parte contact 
prohibitions.42 
One theory holds that pro se lawyers are not employed or in 
the representative capacity of clients, given that attorneys cannot be 
employees or agents of themselves.43 Thus, pro se lawyers are "par­
37. 	 See supra note 1 for a comparison of the text of each rule. 
38. Following extensive studies conducted by the ABA's Commission on Evalua­
tion of Professional Standards, the ABA House of Delegates adopted the Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct on August 2, 1983. See Parrish, supra note 2, at 650 (citing 
MODEL RULES Preface (1986». 
39. See Parrish, supra note 2, at 650; see also CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RE· 
SPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TIiE 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuer: THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN TIiE ABA 
HOUSE OF DELEGATES 34 (1987); Robert J. Kutak, The Next Step in Legal Ethics: 
Some Observations About the Proposed Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct, 30 CATIi. 
V.L. REv. 1,5-6 (1980) (discussing format changes in Model Rules). 
40. 	 MODEL RULES Rule 4.2 emt.1. 
41. See Downey, supra note 4, at 551-54; Barenholtz, supra note 10, at 440 n.225 
(ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility is silent concerning the general appli­
cability of rules to attorney self-representation). 
42. Compare Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 1994) (pro se attorney 
considered representing a client) with Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 578 A.2d 
1075 (Conn. 1990) (holding that an attorney did not represent a client by acting on his 
own behalf). 
43. See Presnick v. Esposito, 513 A.2d 165, 167 (Conn. App. 1986); O'Neil v. Ber­
gan, 452 A.2d 337, 344 (D.C. App. 1982). 
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ties to matters" having independent rights not abrogated by profes­
sional status and accompanying ethical concerns.44 Some 
commentators assert that direct communication between lawyer-lit­
igants and opposing parties may save resources and expedite litiga­
tion by eliminating middle-men.45 Furthermore, there may exist 
situations where Rule 4.2's protection is not necessary, e.g., in the 
case of amicable proceedings or suits involving sophisticated and 
experienced litigants.46 This theory asserts that lawyer self-repre­
sentation supersedes the Model Rules which govern professional 
status. Hence, one extreme response to the issue is simply not to 
apply Rule 4.2 to pro se lawyers.47 
For example, in Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance Committee,48 the 
Connecticut Supreme Court held that a lawyer, acting on his own 
behalf, may directly contact an opposing party without consent of 
the adverse party's lawyer.49 Attorney Irving J. Pinsky maintained 
his office' in New Haven, Connecticut, in a building owned by the 
Bank of Boston.50 The manager of the building was an employee of 
the Bank of Boston named Eric Connery. 51 The bank sought to 
evict Pinsky from the building.52 While Pinsky did not appear pro 
se, retaining outside counsel to represent him in the eviction action, 
he nonetheless acted on his own behalf in response to the bank's 
action.53 Pinsky sent a letter to Connery's home expressing "his 
44. See MODEL RULES Rule 4.2 emt.1; see also Downey, supra note 4, at 553. 
45. See Leubsdorf, supra note 34, at 686-87. But see Kurlantzik, supra note 36, at 
145-46. 
46. See Kuriantzik, supra note 36, at 145-46; see also Downey, supra note 4, at 551 
n.l97. Downey cites People ex rel Brazen v. Finley, 497 N.E.2d 1013 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1986), affd, 519 N.E.2d 898 (Ill. 1988), as an example of when attorney self-representa­
tion does not compromise ethical obligations. Downey notes that Brazen did not in­
volve the credibility of the pro se lawyer as the entire case was a question of law rather 
than fact. See Brazen, 497 N.E.2d at 1016. "[T]he attorney-plaintiff's motives were 
beyond reproach .. " In fact, Brazen's actions conformed with the attorney's duty to 
work for law reform ...." Downey, supra note 4, at 551 n.197 (citing Brazen, 497 
N.E.2d at 1016). 
47. See, e.g., In re American Cable Publications, Inc., 768 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir. 
1985); Public Servo Elec. & Gas Co. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs., Ltd., 745 F. 
Supp. 1037 (D.N.J. 1990); Theobald v. Botein, Hays, Sklar & Herzberg, 465 F. Supp. 
609 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Borman V. Borman, 393 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1979). 
48. 578 A.2d 1075 (Conn. 1990). 
49. See id. at 1079. 
50. See id. at 1076. 
51. See id. 
52. See id. The opinion gives no reason as to why Pinsky was being evicted. "The 
bank ... began a summary process action against [Pinsky], seeking to evict him from 
the building." Id. 
53. See id. 
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frustration with the events surrounding the eviction, and threatened 
to initiate legal action against Connery."S4 
Subsequently, Connery filed a complaint with the Statewide 
Grievance Committee charging Pinsky with violation of Connecti­
cut's Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for sending the 
letter directly to him.55 The Committee concluded that Pinsky was 
representing a client, namely himself, and had violated Rule 4.2 and 
reprimanded him.56 
In May, 1989, Pinsky appealed this reprimand to the Superior 
Court in the Judicial District of New Haven.57 Pinsky argued he 
was not representing a client at the time of his contact with Con­
nery. Hence, his actions were not governed by Rule 4.2.58 The trial 
court agreed and sustained Pinsky's appeal,59 rescinded the Com­
mittee's reprimand, and ordered an appropriate publication to that 
effect be published in the Connecticut Law Journal.60 
The Committee appealed and the Appellate Court transferred 
the matter to the Connecticut Supreme Court.61 The Connecticut 
Supreme Court stated: 
Contact between litigants, . . . is specifically authorized by the 
comments under Rule 4.2: "This Rule does not prohibit commu­
nication with a party ... concerning matters outside the represen­
tation . . . . Also, parties to a matter may communicate directly 
with each other and a lawyer having independent justification for 
communicating with the other party is permitted to do so." The 
language of Rule 4.2 and the comments thereto, limit the restric­
tion on communications with represented parties to those situa­
tions where the attorney is "representing a client." Here, 
[Pinsky] was not "representing a client."62 
Finding that the letter Pinsky sent Connery "was a communication 
54. Id. at 1076-77. 
55. See id. See MODEL RULES Rule 4.2 and MODEL CoDE DR 7-104(A)(I), 
supra note 1 for the text of each provision. 
56. See Pinsky, 578 A.2d at 1077. The court's opinion, however, does not detail 
what consisted of this reprimand. Generally, a reprimand is defined as "[t]o reprove 
severely; to censure formally, especially with authority." BLACK'S LAW DICI10NARY . 
1302 (6th ed. 1990). . 
57. See Pinsky, 578 A.2d at 1077. 
58. See id. 
59. See id. But see In re Segall, 509 N.E.2d 988, 990 (III. 1987) ("An attorney who 
is himself a party to the litigation represents himself when he contacts an opposing 
party."). 
60. See Pinsky, 578 A.2d at 1077. 
61. See id. 
62. Id. at 1079 (emphasis in original). 
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between litigants," the court held that Pinsky had a right to make 
such communication because he was not representing a client.63 
The court noted that "[t]here was no evidence that suggests that the 
letter was written by [Pinsky] in a representative capacity."64 The 
court concluded by saying that Pinsky's conduct may have been im­
prudent, but it did not violate Rule 4.2.65 
Similarly, pro se lawyers in California may directly contact rep­
resented parties without consent of opposing counsel. 66 The Cali­
fornia State Bar in its opinion of Rule 2-1()()67 reasoned that 
attorney-litigants have independent rights that professional status 
should not invalidate.68 Rather than prevent pro se lawyers from 
directly communicating with adverse parties, "the commentary to 
the California rule suggests that to avoid abusive practices, the bur­
den is on the opposing party's counsel to warn his or her client 
against participating in such communications."69 Hence, pro se 
lawyers are permitted to directly contact opposing parties without 
counsel's consent. 
An opposing view holds that attorneys who are themselves 
parties to litigation represent themselves, and are therefore "cli­
ents" under the comment to Rule 4.2.70 Courts adopting this inter­
63. Id. But see Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103, 108-09 (Wyo. 1994). "The 
Illinois Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion and held: 'An Attorney who is 
himself a party to the litigation represents himself when he contacts an opposing 
party.''' Id. (quoting In re Segall, 509 N.E.2d at 990). 
64. Pinsky, 578 A,2d at 1019. 
65. See ill. 
66. See Downey, supra note 4, at 553 (citing ST. B. CAL. RULES OF PROFES­
SIONAL CoNDucr Rule 2-100 Discussion (1989». Downey cites both California and 
Michigan's Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.2 as examples of different jurisdic­
tions applying substantially similar rules under contlicting interpretations. See Downey, 
supra note 4, at 552-54. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of Michigan's Rule 4.2. 
67. See ST. B. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 2-100. This rule 
states, in relevant part: 
While representing a client, a member shall not communicate directly or indi­
rectly about the subject of the representation with a party the member knows 
to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the member has the 
consent of the other lawyer. . . . This rule shall not prohibit . . . 
[c]ommunications otherwise authorized by law. 
Id.; see also Downey, supra note 4, at 553. See supra note 1 for the text of MODEL 
RULES Rule 4.2 and MODEL CoDE DR 7-104(A)(I). 
68. See ST. B. CAL. RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUcr Rule 2-100 Discussion 
(1989); Downey, supra note 4, at 553. 
69. Downey, supra note 4, at 553 (citing ST. B. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CoNDucr Rule 2-100 Discussion (1989». 
70. See, e.g., Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103, 109 (Wyo. 1994). 
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pretation maintain that "[a] party, having employed counsel to act 
as an intermediary between himself and opposing counsel, does not 
lose the protection of [Rule 4.2] merely because opposing counsel is 
also a party to the litigation."71 This view holds that pro se lawyers 
do not have independent rights superseding the Model Rules; 
hence, another extreme response to the issue is completely banning 
pro se lawyer ex parte communications.72 
For example, on August 25, 1994, the Supreme Court of Wyo­
ming decided Sandstrom v. Sandstrom.73 Mr. and Mrs. Sandstrom 
married on February 20, 1981.74 Mrs. Sandstrom separated from 
Mr. Sandstrom in July, 1987.75 Mr. Sandstrom petitioned for disso­
lution of the marriage in September, 1988.76 The couple divorced in 
Florida in 1991.77 Mr. Sandstrom, an attorney, handled the divorce 
pro se, while Mrs. Sandstrom retained counsel.78 
During the legal proceeding, Mr. Sandstrom contacted Mrs. 
Sandstrom without the consent of her lawyer to discuss settling 
their differences.79 Mrs. Sandstrom complained and the lower court 
ordered Mr. Sandstrom to have no ex parte contact with Mrs. Sand­
strom.so Mr. Sandstrom appealed the state district court's order en­
joining him from having ex parte contact with Mrs. Sandstrom.81 
According to Mr. Sandstrom, the district court's order was an im­
proper restraining order.82 
The Wyoming Supreme Court ruled that Mr. Sandstrom, as an 
attorney licensed to practice in Wyoming "was, therefore, an officer 
of the court and subject to the control of the COurts."83 Citing Rule 
4.2 of the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at 
Law, the court held that Mr. Sandstrom, as a party to the litigation, 
represented himself when he contacted Mrs. Sandstrom.84 The 
71. Id. 
72. See,e.g., Porter v. Arco Metals Co., 642 F. Supp. 1116 (0. Mont. 1986); 
Bobele v. Superior Court, 245 Cal. Rptr. 144 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
73. 880 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 1994). 
74. See Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 617 So. 2d 327, 328 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 
75. See id. 
76. See id. 
77. See Sandstrom, 880 P.2d at 104. 
78. See id. 
79. See id. at 109. 

SO. See id. at 105. 

81. See id. at 108. 
82. See id. 
83. Id. at 108. 
84. See id. Rule 4.2 provides: 

In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of 
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court stated that the rule "'is designed to protect litigants repre­
sented by counsel from direct contacts by opposing counsel. A 
party, having employed counsel to act as an intermediary between 
himself and opposing counsel, does not lose the protection of the 
rule merely because opposing counsel is also a party to the 
litigation."'85 
The court observed that "the need for such protection [was] 
especially evident under the facts of this case."86 Mrs. Sandstrom 
was in the hospital when Mr. Sandstrom contacted her about set­
tling their differences.87 Mrs. Sandstrom says she asked Mr. Sand­
strom to contact her attorney and that Mr. Sandstrom ignored her 
request.88 The Wyoming Supreme Court concluded that "[t]he wife 
was entitled to be protected by Rule 4.2. The district court did not 
err when it ordered the husband to have no further ex parte con­
tacts with the wife."89 
Another example is In re Segall.')() An attorney incurred huge 
credit card debts.91 Subsequently, a complaint was filed against the 
lawyer to recover the unpaid balances.92 The attorney, appearing 
pro se, contacted the complainant directly by tendering payment in 
settlement of the debts.93 Unfortunately, the pro se attorney never 
the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another 
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or 
is authorized by law to do so. 
Id.; see also MODEL CoDE DR 7-104(A)(1), supra note 1. See generally Burke, supra 
note 21, at 1639. Burke comments: 
The rule prevents attorneys from communicating about the subject of repre­
sentation with parties they know to be represented by counsel, unless the 
party's lawyer is present or consents to the communication, or the law autho­
rizes direct communication. The rule originally was designed to address im­
balances in knowledge and skill between lawyers and adverse parties by 
preventing attorneys from using their superior legal skills to manipulate 
laypersons. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). But see MODEL RULES Rule 4.2 emt.1. "This Rule does not 
prohibit communication with a [party] ... concerning matters outside the representa­
tion.... Also, parties to a matter may communicate directly with each other . ..." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
85. Sandstrom, 880 P.2d at 109 (quoting In re Segall, 509 N.E.2d 988, 990 (1987». 
86. Id. 
87. See id. 
88. See id. 
89. Id. 
90. 509 N.E.2d 988 (UI. 1987). 
91. See id. at 989. The attorney incurred credit card debts amounting to more 
than $24,000. See id. 
92. See id. 
93. See id. The attorney tendered payment of $144.36 as an offer of settlement 
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received the complainant's lawyers' consent to communicate di­
rectly with the complainant.94 
The attorney argued that his communication was made on his 
own behalf as litigant to the matter and was not in the course of 
"his representation of a c1ient."95 The Supreme Court of Illinois 
held that the attorney, as a party to the litigation, was representing 
himself when he contacted the complainant.96 The attorney was 
subject to Illinois' Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary 
Rule 7-104(A)(1).97 The attorney was suspended from the practice 
of law for two years for violating DR 7-104(A)(1) because he con­
tacted the opposing party without counsel's prior consent.98 
Similarly, a Michigan State Bar Committee on Professional 
and Judicial Ethics opinion states that Michigan's Rule 4.299 applies 
to pro se lawyers to prohibit them from directly communicating 
with parties represented by counse1. lOO A pro se lawyer asked 
whether it was permissible, as party to a matter himself, to settle a 
dispute with an opposing party without the authority or consent of 
the party's counse1.l0l The Michigan Comniittee ruled that Rule 4.2 
applied to the self-represented attorney to prevent him from di­
rectly contacting the opposing party without counsel's consent.102 
The Committee gave several reasons for prohibiting direct con­
tact with represented parties.103 First, the rule is designed to pro­
tect non-lawyers from making unintentional and harmful 
and payment of the debts, including "any and all claims, causes of action and matters in 
dispute." Id. 
94. See id. 
95. Id. at 990. 
96. See id. 
97. See id. Illinois adopted MODEL CoDE DR 7-104(A)(1). See id. See supra 
note 1 for the text of DR 7-104(A)(1). 
98. See In re Segall, 509 N.E.2d at 991. 
99. See Downey, supra note 4, at 552-53. MICHIGAN RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CoNDuer Rule 4.2 provides: 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject 
matter of the representation with a party whom the lawyer knows to be repre­
sented in the matter by another lawyer, unless the lawyer has the consent of 
the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so. 
Id. Downey cites both California and Michigan's Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 
4.2 as examples of different jurisdictions applying substantially similar rules under con­
flicting interpretations. See Downey, supra note 4, at 552-54. See supra notes 66-69 
and accompanying text for a discussion of California's Rule 2-100; See also MODEL 
RULES Rule 4.2, supra note 1 (identical rule). 
100. See MICH. ST. B. CI-1206, at 3; Downey, supra note 4, at 552. 
101. See MICH. ST. B. CI-1206, at 1; Downey, supra note 4, at 552-53. 
102. See MICH. ST. B. CI-1206, at 3; Downey, supra note 4, at 553. 
103. See MICH. ST. B. CI-1206, at 2-3; Downey, supra note 4, at 553. 
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" 
admissions.104 Secondly, the rule prevents lawyers from "unfairly 
employing superior negotiating and interrogation skills to the non­
attorney's detriment."los Finally, the rule "preserve[s] the protec­
tive and insulating role of counsel. "106 The Committee concluded 
that the policies supporting Rule 4.2 remain in effect when one 
party is a self-represented lawyer, and thus, prohibit direct commu­
nication between pro se lawyers and opposing parties.107 
In sum, DR 7-104(A)(1) and Rule 4.2 are designed to protect 
represented clients from improper attorney communication and 
contact.lOS The rules "prevent situations in which [represented par­
ties] may be taken advantage of by adverse counsel; the presence of 
the party's attorney theoretically neutralizes the contact. "109 The 
rules are designed to address "imbalances in knowledge and skill 
between lawyers and adverse parties" by prohibiting lawyers from 
using their legal knowledge and skills to manipulate laypersons.llo 
Unfortunately, courts and the rules themselves do not satisfac­
torily answer whether and when ex parte proscriptions should apply 
to pro se lawyers.lll Attorneys should be held to high ethical stan­
dards when dealing with nonlawyers.112 Accordingly, the ethical 
obligations of lawyers to refrain from improper conduct and ap­
pearance must be considered in order to determine whether and 
when Rule 4.2 applies to proscribe the ex parte behavior of pro se 
attorneys. 
104. See MICH. ST. B. CI-l206, at 2; Downey, supra note 4, at 553; Herreman, 
supra note 32, at 862-63; Leubsdorf, supra note 34, at 686. 
105. Downey, supra note 4, at 553 (citing MICH. ST. B. CI-I206, at 2-3); see also 
Herreman, supra note 32, at 862-63. 
106. Downey, supra note 4, at 553 (citing MICH. ST. B. CI-1206, at 2). 
107. See MICH. ST. B. CI-1206, at 3; Downey, supra note 4, at 553. 
108. See Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 567 (Wash. 1984) (en 
banc). 
109. Id. 
110. Burke, supra note 21, at 1639 (footnote omitted). 
111. Indeed, "[i]nterpretation of attorney ethical rules, however, should be clear 
and consistent with the goal of maintaining high standards of integrity." Green, supra 
note 28, at 287. Moreover, the Supreme Court states that: 
[t]he interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since law­
yers are essential to the primary governmental function of administering jus­
tice, and have historically been "officers of the courts." While lawyers act in 
part as "self-employed businessmen," they also act "as trusted agents of their 
clients, and as assistants to the court in search of a just solution to disputes." 
Id. (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978) (citations 
omitted». 
112. See Green, supra note 28, at 287. 
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B. Attorney Ethics 
Attorneys play three roles in the legal system when represent­
ing clients: representatives of clients, officers of the court, and pub­
lic citizens.u3 Each role is accompanied by professional 
responsibilities and ethical obligations as established in the Model 
Rules Preamble that overlap and intersect with one another.n4 
Lawyers serve the interests of their clients by meeting these obliga­
tions and "also the public interest by ensuring the proper adminis­
tration of justice. "115 
The ethical obligations of lawyers in their legal, professional, 
and personal roles guard and protect not only attorneys, but clients 
and the legal system as well. These rules are found in the ABA 
Model Rules and the Disciplinary Rules of the Model Code.116 
These standards mandate that lawyers remain objective in exercis­
ing legal judgment, refrain from using the legal process for the pur­
pose of harassing others, and avoid the appearance of 
impropriety.117 
litigants.11s 
Moreover, these standards apply to pro se 
1. The Objectivity Requirement 
Lawyers are required to maintain objectivity so that they may 
exercise competent and independent legal judgment.119 Such judg­
ment is "necessary to protect both the interests of the client and 
those of the legal system."120 The Model Rules and Model Code 
reflect the obligation of objectivity in rendering legal advice and 
113. See MODEL RULES Preamble. See Downey, supra note 4, at 535-37 for an 
in-depth discussion on the role of pro se attorneys as officers of the court and public 
citizens. Downey thoroughly examines the broad ethical requirements of objectivity, 
refraining from harassment, and avoiding the appearance of impropriety as standards 
that govern all attorney conduct, pro se or otherwise. This Note relies heavily on Dow­
ney's examination and points the researcher to Downey's Note for additional or further 
research and citations. 
114. See MODEL RULES Preamble. "A lawyer is a representative of clients, an 
officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the qual­
ity of justice." Id. 
115. Downey, supra note 4, at 535 (footnote omitted): see also WOLFRAM, supra 
note 5, at § 1.1. 
116. See generally MODEL RULES and MODEL CoDE. 
117. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Preamble; MODEL CoDE Preamble. See generally 
Downey, supra note 4. 
118. See generally Downey, supra note 4 for a discussion of the applicability of 
ethical rules to pro se attorneys. 
119. See WOLFRAM, supra note 5, at § 10.2.1 (a lawyer's detachment is essential 
to the proper functioning of the legal system); Downey, supra note 4, at 537. 
120. Downey, supra note 4, at 537 (footnote omitted). 
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deciding whether to take legal action.121 Hence, attorney objectiv­
ity serves effective client representation and ensures the fair admin­
istration of justice while promoting the public interest.122 
For example, in Duke v. United States,123 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction of 
an attorney who attempted to defend himself pro se.124 The attor­
ney in Duke was charged with aiding in the illegal importation of 
exotic birds from Mexico.125 The court of appeals refused to re­
verse the conviction, stating that Duke himself was to blame for any 
confusion from his lack of objectivity.126 The court went on to say 
that Duke should have appreciated the harm he was doing to his 
own case by representing himself.127 Duke's lack of objectivity re­
sulted in a conviction which was upheld on appeal.128 
Duke is a good example of the effect of a pro se lawyer's lack 
of objectivity.129 Pro se attorneys, "regardless of experience, will 
lack the requisite objectivity to decide how best to frame the issues, 
order the evidence and cross-examine hostile witness."13o In order 
to effectively and ethically serve the interests of clients and uphold 
the adversarial process, lawyers must exercise objectivity.131 
Objectivity is implicitly required in the various rules governing 
121. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 1.2 cmt.6 ("A lawyer is required to give an 
honest opinion about the actual consequences that appear likely to result from a client's 
conduct.H); Rule 2.1 ("In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent pro­
fessional judgment and render candid advice."); see also MODEL CoDE DR 5-101 (law­
yers should not undertake employment that may impair independent judgment); 
MODEL CoDE Canon 5 (lawyers should exercise independent judgment on behalf of 
clients). 
122. See, e.g., MODEL CoDE Preamble ("So long as [lawyers] are guided by [ob­
jectivity], the law will continue to be a noble profession."). 
123. 255 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1958). See Downey, supra note 4, at 542 for further 
discussion concerning the significance of Duke. 
124. See Duke, 255 F.2d at 730. 
125. See id. at 723. 
126. See id. at 725. 
127. See id. 
128. See id. at 730. 
129. See generally id. See Downey, supra note 4, at 541-50 for a comprehensive 
review of cases in which attorney self-representation have violated ethical standards. 
130. Downey, supra note 4, at 546 (citing Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 437 (1991» 
("In the unpredictable atmosphere of the courtroom, ... separate counsel ensures that 
reason, and not the client's emotion, dictates trial strategy. Self-representation by an 
attorney may often result in less effective lawyering than representation by separate 
counsel.") (footnotes and citation omitted). 
131. See Downey, supra note 4, at 540. MODEL CoDE Ee 9-4 provides: 
Because the very essence of the legal system is to provide procedures by which 
matters can be presented in an impartial manner so that they may be decided 
solely upon the merits, any statement or suggestion by a lawyer that he can or 
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attorney conduct concerning a client's case.132 Lawyers must afford 
honest opinions about actual consequences of a client's case under 
existing law.133 Attorneys must protect client interests from subver­
sion by an attorney's own interests.l34 Lawyers can provide the 
most effective representation for clients by adhering to these objec­
tivity rules and not violating ethical obligations.135 
The objectivity requirement allows attorneys to withdraw from 
employment if they feel their legal judgment will be hampered or 
impaired by a client's objectives or other unlawful actions the client 
wishes the attorney to take.l36 Attorneys should not accept "prof­
fered employment if ... personal interests or desires will ... affect 
adversely the advice to be given or services to be rendered the pro­
spective client."137 Thus, in addition to effective client representa,. 
tion, the fair administration of justice and the public interest will be 
better served by attorney objectivity.138 
The objectivity requirement mandates that lawyers refuse or 
withdraw from employment when clients demand actions that vio­
late rules of professional conduct and the law.139 Objective legal 
would attempt to circumvent those procedures is detrimental to the legal sys­
tem and tends to undermine public confidence in it. 
Id. 
132. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.1 ("A lawyer shall provide competent representa­
tion to a client."); see also MODEL CoDE DR 6-101(A)(1), which provides that lawyers 
shall not handle matters "which [they know] or should know that [they are] not compe­
tent to handle, without associating [themselves] with [] lawyer[s] who [are] competent 
to handle it." Id. DR 6-101(A)(2) requires "preparation adequate in the circum­
stances." Id. 
133. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.2 cmt.6 ("A lawyer is required to give an honest 
opinion about the actual consequences that appear likely to result from a client's 
conduct. "). 
134. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.7 (lawyers must avoid conflicts of interest); see 
also MODEL CoDE DR 5-101(A) ("[e]xcept with the consent of his client after full dis­
closure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of his professional judg­
ment on behalf of the client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, 
business, property, or personal interests."); DR 5-105(A) ("[A lawyer] shall decline 
proffered employment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment in be­
half of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the 
proffered employment."). 
135. See MODEL RULES Preamble. 
136. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.16(b)(3) (declining or terminating representa­
tion); see also MODEL CoDE DR 2-110(C) (attorneys may withdraw from employment 
if clients insist "that the lawyer pursue a course of conduct that is illegal or that is 
prohibited under the Disciplinary Rules"). 
137. MODEL CoDE Ee 5-2. 
138. See MODEL CoDE Preamble ("So long as [lawyers] are guided by [objectiv­
ity], the law will continue to be a noble profession."). 
139. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.16(a)(1) (lawyers shall not represent clients or 
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judgment should filter frivolous claims for the legal system and pre­
vent the abuse of the legal process.l40 The objectivity requirement 
ensures fairness not only to attorneys and clients, but to the adver­
sarial system as well.141 
2. The Legitimate Purpose Requirement 
Whether on behalf of clients or on behalf of their own inter­
ests, lawyers should use the legal process for legitimate purposes 
and not to harass or threaten others.142 Lawyers are required to 
withdraw from employment if clients demand that attorneys abuse 
the law's procedures.143 Lawyers who engage in harassment 
through· the legal process or abusive conduct injure both the target 
of the harassment and the legal system.l44 
For example, in Fox v. Boucher,145 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a pro se attorney's lawsuit 
involving one of the lawyer's tenants was an abuse of the legal pro­
cess.l46 Attorney Fox, a New York resident and owner of rental 
property in Massachusetts, refused to return his tenant's security 
deposit after the tenant lawfully requested it from him.147 The ten­
ant brought a small claims action against Fox in Massachusetts to 
recover the security deposit. Fox counterclaimed for $5,000 com­
pensatory damages.l48 
At trial, the lower court concluded that Fox's action was frivo­
withdraw from employment if "the representation will result in violation of the rules of 
professional conduct or other law"). 
140. See WOlJ'RAM, supra note 5, at § 11.2.2. 
141. See generally WOlJ'RAM, supra note 5, at § 10.2.1; Downey, supra note 4, at 
540. 
142. See MODEL RULES Preamble. 
143. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.16(a)(I) (lawyers shall not represent clients if the 
representation "will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other 
law"). Such actions violate Rule 3.1 (meritorious claims and contentions) and Rule 4.4 
(respect for rights of third persons) of the Model Rules, and likewise, DR 2-109(A) 
(acceptance of employment) and DR 2-110 (withdrawal from employment) of the 
Model Code. 
144. See MODEL RULES Preamble; Downey, supra note 4, at 539. 
145. 794 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1986). See Downey, supra note 4, at 547 for further 
discussion on the significance of Fox. 
146. See Fox, 794 F.2d at 38. 
147. See ill. at 36. In a telephone call, the tenant's father demanded the return of 
the security deposit, and Fox refused. See ill. Fox claimed that the father called him a 
"rich lawyer," and then Fox threatened to bring suit. See ill. 
148. See ill. at 36. Additionally, Fox sued for punitive damages for mental and 
physical suffering stemming from the telephone conversation. See ill. After losing on 
all his defenses and counterclaims at state trial, Fox sued the tenant's father in New 
York court for $100,000 in tort and punitive damages. See ill. at 36-37. The case was 
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lous and in bad faith.149 When Fox moved to vacate the judgment 
in favor of the tenant, the trial judge imposed sanctions against 
Fox.1sO On Fox's pro se appeal, the Second Circuit noted that, as a 
lawyer, Fox should have known his allegations were fiimsy and friv­
oIOUS.1S1 In sum, the court of appeals found sanctions appropriate 
when a pro se attorney brings frivolous actions in order to harass 
others.1S2 
The legitimate purpose requirement reflects the notion that 
when lawyers generate frivolous cases or engage in harassment 
through the legal process using abusive tactics; lawyers victimize 
not only the targets of harassment, but the legal system as well.1S3 
Lawyers have "a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit 
of the client's cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal proce­
dure."154 Conduct that violates the legitimate purpose requirement 
also violates ethical obligations to improve the legal system and not 
to hinder the administration of justice.1ss 
The legal profession expects attorneys to meet the obligations 
associated with their role as officers of the court and public citizens 
outside of attorney-client relationships.1s6 By meeting these obliga­
tions, lawyers preserve society's trust and confidence in the legal 
profession by ensuring that the legal system maintains its integ­
rity.1S7 Additionally, the pursuit of high ethical standards encour­
ages public trust in the legal profession and the legal system.1S8 
As officers of the court, lawyers have an obligation to show 
removed on diversity grounds to the Federal District Court for the Southern District of 
New York where it was dismissed on summary judgment. See id. at 37. 
149. See id. 
150. See id. The trial judge imposed a $4,000 sanction on Fox under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 11. See id. at 37-38. 
151. See id. at 37. The court noted that such sanctions are particularly well suited 
to punish attorneys who, as parties to an action, engage in harassing litigation. See id. 
152. See id. at 38. 
153. See generally MODEL RULES Preamble; Downey, supra note 4, at 539. 
154. MODEL RULES Rule 3.1 emt.1; see also MODEL CoDE DR 7-102(A)(1) (law­
yers shall not "file ... suit[s] ... when [they] know[] ... that such action would serve 
merely to harass or maliciously injure another"). 
155. See MODEL CoDE DR 7-102(A)(1) (prohibiting lawyers from filing frivolous 
actions); see also MODEL RULES Rule 3.1 emt.1 ("The [lawyer] has a duty ... not to 
abuse legal procedure. "). 
156. See MODEL RULES Preamble ("A lawyer's conduct should conform to the 
requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the lawyer's busi­
ness and personal affairs."). 
157. See MODEL RULES Preamble; see also MODEL CoDE Preamble ("Lawyers, 
as guardians of the law, playa vital role in the preservation of society."); Downey, 
supra note 4, at 535-37. 
158. See Downey, supra note 4, at 536. 
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respect for the legal system and for those who serve it.159 Lawyers 
engaging in questionable conduct may violate ethical obligations as 
officers of the court.1OO The consequent harm to the public's faith 
discredits the legal profession's integrity, which lawyers have an ob­
ligation to uphold.161 Hence, lawyers, as officers of the court, must 
refrain from using the legal process for purposes of harassment or 
intimidation.162 
3. Avoiding the Appearance of Impropriety Requirement 
Attorneys are chastised for having more concern with personal 
gain and profit than in pursuing justice.163 The legal profession is 
sensitive to the effect that image has on the public's trust in law­
yers.164 In addition to the objectivity requirement and rules prohib­
iting harassing actions, there are rules that define a lawyer's 
responsibility to avoid the appearance of impropriety. These rules 
forbid lawyers from delaying litigation at the expense of justice,165 
159. The MODEL RULES Preamble states: 
A lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in 
professional service to clients and in the lawyer's business and personal affairs. 
A lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not 
to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the 
legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and 
public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the 
rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal process. 
Id.; see also MODEL CoDE EC 9-6 ("[Lawyers] owe[] a solemn duty ... to encourage 
respect for the law and for the courts and the judges thereof. "). 
160. ct. Downey, supra note 4, at 540. 
161. See Downey, supra note 4, at 540 (citing MODEL RULES 8.1-8.5 (maintaining 
the integrity of the legal profession». 
162. See MODEL RULES Preamble; see also Downey, supra note 4, at 535. 
163. See James E. Brill, Dan Quayle Was Right: Too Many Lawyers Focusing on 
Fees, Not on Clients, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1992, at 86 ("There are too many lawyers who 
apparently have missed the courses on professionalism and who have confused a 
scorched-earth approach to every legal matter with the duty of zealous representa­
tion."); see also Green, supra note 28, at 2E7. 
The legal profession is one of the most cynically viewed professions in this 
country, perhaps in large part because lawyers are perceived to manipulate the 
law. Many people might agree with Shakespeare's butcher that "the first thing 
we do, let's kill all the lawyers." To many, the term "ethical attorney" is an 
oxymoron. Critics often label attorneYs "hired guns." 
[d. (footnotes omitted); see also Cooper, supra note 29, at 8 ("Confidence in the Ameri­
can justice system begins with the public perception of lawyers."). 
164. See Brill, supra note 163, at 86; Green, supra note 28, at 286 (" 'Loophole 
lawyering' occurs when an attorney is less concerned with applying the whole law than 
with finding a way to accomplish the goals of the client by exploiting a perceived ambi­
guity in the language of the rule or statute. The practice of loophole lawyering appears 
to be widespread.") (footnotes omitted). 
165. See MODEL RULES Rule 32 (attorneys should expedite litigation); MODEL 
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failing to cooperate in discovery,166 engaging in disruptive conduct 
before the COurt,167 communicating with represented parties with­
out consent of opposing counsel,168 and disregarding the rights of 
third persons.169 These rules govern attorney conduct in order to 
protect not only attorneys, but also clients and the legal system.170 
The importance of avoiding the appearance of impropriety is 
fully explained in Canon 9 of the Model Code.171 Society's confi­
dence in law and in lawyers may be undermined by improper or 
irresponsible lawyer behavior.172 The success of the adversarial and 
legal system requires Americans to "have faith that justice can be 
obtained through our legal system."173 By upholding the 'integrity 
and honor of the legal profession, lawyers promote public confi­
dence and faith in the legal system.174 Society's trust and belief in 
the legal system is necessary for the "[c]ontinuation of the Ameri­
can concept that we are to be governed by rules of law."17S Thus, 
CoDE DR 7-101(A)(1) (attorneys do not violate duty to represent clients zealously "by 
being punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments"); see also Downey, supra 
note 4, at 539. 
166. See MODEL ,RULES Rule 3.4 (lawyers shall be fair to opposing parties and 
counsel); MODEL CoDE DR 7-102(A)(5) (lawyers shall not "knowingly make a false 
statement of law or fact"); see also Downey, supra note 4, at 539. 
167. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.5 (lawyers shall not disrupt the impartiality or 
decorum of the tribunal); MODEL CoDE DR 7-106(C)(6) (lawyers shall not engage in 
"undignified or discourteous conduct which is degrading to a tribunal"); see also Dow­
ney, supra note 4, at 539. . 
168. See MODEL RULES Rule 4.2 (attorneys must not communicate with repre­
sented parties without consent of opposing counsel); MODEL CoDE DR 7-104(A)(1) 
(substantially identical to Rule 4.2); see also Downey, supra note 4, at 539. 
169. See MODEL RULES Rule 4.4 (lawyers must not use harassing or .burdening 
tactics against others); MODEL CoDE DR 7-108(E) ("[Lawyers] shall not conduct ... a 
vexatious or harassing investigation of either a venireman or a juror."); see also Dow­
ney, supra note 4, at 539. 
170. See MODEL RULES Preamble. 

[D]ifficult ethical problems arise from conflict[s] between a lawyer's responsi­

bilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in re­

maining an upright person .... The Rules of Professional Conduct prescribe 
terms for resolving such conflicts. . .. Such issues must be resolved through 
the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic 
principles underlying the Rules. 
Id. 
171. See generally MODEL CoDE Canon 9. 
172. See MODEL CoDE EC 9-2 ("Public confidence in law and lawyers may be 
eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of a lawyer."). 
173. MODEL CoDE EC 9-1 (footnote omitted). 
174: See id. ("A lawyer should promote public confidence in our system and in 
the legal profession."); see also EC 9-6 ("[A lawyer] owes a solemn duty to uphold the 
integrity and honor of his profession. "). 
175. MODEL CoDE EC 9-1. 
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by avoiding impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety, 
lawyers promote the confidence, respect, and trust of society in law­
yers themselves and the legal system and profession.176 
Courts have long stressed the importance of avoiding even the 
appearance of impropriety.177 As stated by the Connecticut 
Supreme Court in 1928: "Integrity is the very breath of justice. 
Confidence in our law, our courts, and in the administration of jus­
tice is our supreme interest. No practice must be permitted to pre­
vail which invites towards the administration of justice a doubt or 
distrust of its integrity."178 Similarly, the Nebraska Supreme Court 
has noted that lawyers should not only avoid actual impropriety, 
but the mere appearance of impropriety as well.179 Fmally, in State 
Board of Law Examiners v. Sheldon,180 the Wyoming Supreme 
Court remarked: 
The lawyer assumes high duties, and has imposed upon him grave 
responsibilities. He may be the means of much good or much 
mischief. Interests of vast magnitude are entrusted to him; confi­
dence is reposed in him; life, liberty, character and property 
should be protected by him. He should guard, with jealous 
watchfulness, his own reputation, as well as that of his 
profession.181 
Lawyers have obligations as officers of the court and public . 
citizens both in professional responsibilities to clients and in busi­
ness and personal affairS.182 Maintaining professional ethical stan­
dards ensures the fair administration of justice.183 Individual rights 
suffer if lawyers fail to meet the ethical standards required to carry 
out their roles.184 Lawyers violating these ethical standards injure 
176. See MODEL CoDE Ee 9-6 (a lawyer has a duty to "conduct himself so as to 
reflect credit on the legal profession and to inspire the confidence, respect, and trust of 
... the public; and to strive to avoid not only professional impropriety but also the 
appearance of impropriety") (footnote omitted). 
177. See, e.g., Erwin M. Jennings Co. v. DiGenova, 141 A 866 (Conn. 1928); State 
ex rel Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Richards, 84 N.W.2d 136 (Neb. 1957); State Bd. of 
Law Examiners v. Sheldon, 7 P.2d 226 (Wyo. 1932). 
178. DiGenova, 141 A at 868. 
179. See Richards, 84 N.W.2d at 145 (citing ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics 
and Grievances, Fonnal Op. 49 (1957». 
180. 7 P.2d 226 (Wyo. 1932). 
181. Id. at 227 (quoting People ex rel Cutler v. Ford, 54 Ill. 520, 522 (1870». 
182. See MODEL RULES Preamble. 
183. See id. 
184. See MODEL CoDE Preamble. See also Professional Responsibility: Report of 
the Joint Conference, 44 AB.A J. 1159 (1958). The report states: 
A true sense of professional responsibility must derive from an understanding 
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the legal profession's goal of serving society, which, in turn, ad­
versely affects the public's trust in the legal system.18S In sum, law­
yers have an unique relationship with courts and society that define 
their conduct in meeting the ethical standards established by the 
Model Rules and Model Code.l86 
II. ANALYSIS 
Lawyers have the same right to self-representation as non-Iaw­
yers.187 Indeed, lawyers have exercised this right in a number of 
cases.l88 Unlike non-attorney pro se litigants, however, lawyers 
have professional obligations to obey specific ethical standards.189 
Pro se lawyers may invariably violate professional responsibilities 
when acting on behalf of their own interests.190 Hence, whether pro 
se attorneys are subject to the same ethical concerns as other attor­
neys must be answered by recognizing attorneys' right to proceed 
pro se while embracing their ethical obligations to the legal process 
and system.191 
of the reasons that lie back of specific restraints. . . . The grounds for the 
lawyer's peculiar obligations are to be found in the nature of his calling. The 
lawyer who seeks a clear understanding of his duties will be led to reflect on 
the special services his profession renders to society and the services it might 
render if its full capacities were realized. When the lawyer fully understands 
the nature of his office, he will then discern what restraints are necessary to 
keep that office wholesome and effective. 
Id. 
185. See MODEL RULES Preamble; see also MODEL CoDE EC 9-6 ("Every lawyer 
owes a solemn duty ... to conduct himself so as to reflect credit on the legal profession 
and to inspire the confidence, respect, and trust of his clients and of the public."). 
186. See generally MODEL RULES Preamble and MODEL CoDE Preamble. 
187. See WOLFRAM, supra note 5, at § 14.4; Downey, supra note 4, at 533-35; see 
also Helen B. Kim, Legal Education for the Pro Se Litigant: A Step Towards a Meaning­
ful Right to be Heard, 96 YALE LJ. 1641, 1641 n.2 (1987) (listing state constitutions and 
statutes granting right of self-representation). 
188. See, e.g., Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991) (civil rights claim); Fox v. 
Boucher, 794 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1986) (tort claim); White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 
614 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1980) (action against creditor under lTuth in Lending Act); Duke 
v. United States, 255 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1958) (criminal defense); Falcone v. IRS, 479 F. 
Supp. 985 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (action against government under Freedom of Information 
Act); Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 1994) (marriage dissolution); 
Presnick v. Esposito, 513 A,2d 165 (Conn. App. 1986) (action against client for fee non­
payment); see also Downey, supra note 4, at 530 n.16. 
189. See MODEL RULES Preamble; MODEL CoDE Preamble; Downey, supra note 
4, at 531. 
190. See supra note 6 and cases cited therein for examples of improper pro se 
attorney conduct. 
191. See generally Downey, supra note 4, at 531. 
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A. Extreme Approaches Do Not Resolve the Conflict 
Conflicts exist between lawyers' right to proceed pro se and 
their accompanying responsibilities to the legal system.192 Pro se 
lawyers may fail to exercise objectivity and allow emotion to ob­
scure legal judgment.193 Lack of objectivity may result in substan­
dard advocacy and burden the legal system.194 Moreover, pro se 
lawyers might easily initiate legal actions to harass or intimidate 
others.195 These practices undermine the obligations of lawyers to 
uphold the legal system and facilitate the fair administration of jus­
tice.196 Unfortunately, whether Model Rules Rule 4.2 or Model 
Code DR 7-104(A)(1) govern ex parte conduct of pro se lawyers 
remains undecided.197 
There are two reasons for this uncertainty. First, the Model 
Rules and the Model Code, together with their accompanying com­
mentary and footnotes are silent concerning the issue of pro se law­
yers.198 Second, the language of the Model Rules and of the Model 
Code appear to logically presuppose the existence of separate cli­
ents.199 Hence, it is not clear whether Rule 4.2 or DR 7-104(A)(1) 
govern pro se attorneys engaged in ex parte communications. 
The Model Rules and Model Code are built on maintaining the 
confidence, integrity, and respect of the legal system.2OO Ethical 
standards such as Rule 4.2 serve to uphold the legal system's integ­
192. See generally Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991); Fox v. Boucher, 794 F.2d 34 
(2d Cir. 1986); Automotive lWins, Inc. v. Klein,82 A.2d 146 (Conn. 1951); MODEL 
CoDE Preamble ("Each lawyer must find within his own conscience the touchstone 
against which to test the extent to which his actions should rise above minimum 
standards.H). 
193. See, e.g., Kay, 499 U.S. at 437; White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 614 F.2d 
387,388 (4th Cir. 1980); Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1958). 
194. See, e.g., Duke, 255 F.2d at 721. 
195. See, e.g., Fox, 794 F.2d at 34; Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 
1994). 
196. See generally MODEL RULES Preamble. 
197. See, e.g .• Barenholtz, supra note 10, at 440 n.225; Green, supra note 28, at 
293-94. "Model Rule 4.2 ... is a prime example of an ambiguous rule. This ... rule has 
been applied differently by various courts and has been interpreted differently by nu­
merous commentators." Id. at 294 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted). See 
Downey, supra note 4, at 554-58 for an extensive analysis as to whether the Model 
Rules and Model Code generally are applicable to pro se attorneys. 
198. See Barenholtz. supra note 10, at 440 n.225. 
199. See Downey, supra note 4, at 532. Rule 42 states that "[i]n representing a 
client, a lawyer shall not communicate ... with a person ... represented by another 
lawyer." MODEL RULES Rule 42. DR 7-104(A)(l) states that "[d]uring the course of 
his representation of a client a lawyer shall not" engage in ex parte communication. 
MODEL CoDE DR 7-104(A)(1). 
200. See MODEL RULES Preamble; MODEL CoDE Preamble ("The possible loss of 
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rity.201 Disregarding Rule 4.2 fails "to protect non-attorney parties 
from making inadvertent, harmful admissions."202 Dismissing Rule 
4.2 will not "prevent [attorneys] from unfairly employing superior 
negotiating and interrogation skills to [a] non-attorney's detri­
ment."203 The above response not only ignores the specific applica­
tion of Rule 4.2, but the ethical obligations of objectivity, refraining 
from harassment, and avoiding the appearance of impropriety as 
well. Overlooking these ethical responsibilities compromises the 
autonomy of the legal profession and society's interest which law­
yers serve.204 Hence, not applying Rule 4.2 to pro se lawyers may 
directly harm opposing parties as well as the public interest and the 
administration of justice.20s 
Conversely, another interpretation of the issue rigidly applies 
Rule 4.2 in every case.206 The theory adopted in Sandstrom holds 
that attorneys who are themselves parties to litigation represent 
themselves when contacting opposing parties.207 This response, 
however, that lawyers are their own clients does not address 
whether pro se lawyers have independent rights as parties to mat­
ters that professional status should not abolish.208 Hence, this view 
fails to afford a proper standard to govern pro se lawyers because a 
that respect and confidence is the ultimate sanction."); WOLFRAM, supra note 5, at 
§ 10.2.1. 
201. See, e.g., WOLFRAM, supra note 5, at § 10.2.1. See generally Downey, supra 
note 4. 
202. Downey, supra note 4, at 553 (footnote omitted); see also Kurlantzik, supra 
note 36, at 138-39. Kurlantzik states: 
The fundamental fact which stimulates our concern is the imbalance in knowl­
edge and skill between the lawyer and the adverse party, who is generally a 
layman. . .. [T]he lawyer can exercise his relative advantage by speaking to 
the layman alone outside the presence of others. In such circumstances there 
is a substantial prospect of avoiding discovery of what actually occurred, and 
such a prospect of avoidance would presumably encourage lawyers both to 
communicate and, in tum, to yield to temptation to mislead. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
203. Downey, supra note 4, at 553; see also Kurlantzik, supra note 36, at 138-39. 
204. See MODEL RULES Preamble. 
205. See Downey, supra note 4, at 555 ("When there are [ethical] violations by 
pro se attorneys and no predictable or definable professional disciplinary consequences, 
the administration of justice may suffer."). 
206. This interpretation ignores the possibility that professional status does not 
abrogate individual rights. See Downey, supra note 4, at 553; see also In re Segall, 509 
N.E.2d 988, 991 (Ill. 1987) (Clark, C.J. dissenting). In his dissenting opinion, Chief 
Justice Clark notes that "the majority simply states, without citation to authority," that 
lawyers represent themselves when parties to litigation. Id. (emphasis added). 
207. See Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103, 109 (Wyo. 1994); see also In re 
Segall, 509 N.E.2d at 990. 
208. See Downey, supra note 4, at 553. 
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total ban of ex parte communication does not recognize independ­
ent rights pro se attorneys enjoy as parties to legal matters.209 
Unfortunately, extreme approaches do not adequately resolve 
the issue. A balance must be struck between the above approaches 
to Rule 4.2's applicability to pro se lawyers. This balance must rec­
ognize the interests of pro se lawyers as well as the competing inter­
ests of the legal system. Accordingly, the proper standard must 
reconcile attorneys' right to s~lf-representation with their ethical 
obligations to clients, courts, and society. 
B. The Conflict Resolved 
This Note advocates the adoption of a rebuttable presump­
tion210 that pro se attorneys violate Rule 4.2 when engaging in un­
209. See MODEL RULES Rule 4.2 emt.l; WOLFRAM, supra note 5, at § 14.4; Dow­
ney, supra note 4, at 533-35. 
210. A rebuttable presumption that attorneys violate ex parte rules, on its own, 
may work as a bar on pro se attorney contact in practice because attorneys might not 
rationally risk having to defend their actions against opposing parties. Lawyers can 
protect themselves from false claims of Rule 4.2 violations under a rebuttable presump­
tion standard in two ways. rrrst, obviously, pro se lawyers can obtain "the consent of 
the other lawyer" or receive court authority. MODEL RULES Rule 4.2. Rule 4.2 states 
that communications between lawyers and opposing parties do not violate the rule 
when "authorized by law." Id. The "authorized by law" exception is satisfied by 
a constitutional provision, statute or court rule, having the force and effect of 
law, that expressly allows a particular communication to occur in the absence 
of counsel-such as court rules providing for service or process on a party, or 
a statute authorizing a government agency to inspect certain regulated prem­
ises. Further, in appropriate circumstances, a court order could provide the 
necessary authorization. 
CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL REsPONSm1LITY, AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, ANNo. 
TATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr 403 (3d ed. 1996) (quoting ABA 
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 396 (1995». Hence, pro 
se lawyers can protect theInselves from false claiIns of Rule 4.2 violations by obtaining 
consent from opposing Ia,wyers to engage in particular ex parte contacts or with permis­
sion from appropriate sources of law, including court orders. 
Secondly, pro se lawyers can protect themselves from false claims with ethics griev­
ance procedures. Before reaching the issue of whether Rule 4.2 applies to pro se law­
yers, opposing parties must show that there exists probable cause to believe that 
unauthorized ex parte contact was made. See, e.g., CoNNECflCUT PRACflCE BOOK 
§ 27F(d) (1996) ("The grievance panel ... shall investigate each complaint to determine 
whether probable cause exists that the attorney is guilty of misconduct."). Since ex 
parte contacts, by definition, are likely to take place privately between pro se lawyers 
and opposing parties, opposing parties should be prevented from using Rule 4.2 as lev­
erage in legal proceedings by requiring any alleged ex parte violation to be specially 
pleaded, much like the requirement of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce­
dure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) ("In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. "). Pleading with particu­
larity affords ethics tribunals opportunities to determine whether there exists probable 
cause to believe Rule 4.2 violations have occurred. If probable cause does not exist 
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authorized ex parte communications.211 This presumption is 
overcome by an attorney's showing that his conduct otherwise satis­
fies the ethical obligations imposed by the Model Rules and Model 
Code.212 This standard strikes a balance between the above ex­
tremes and is flexible enough to permit courts to decide when the 
rule's protection is warranted and is in the interest of opposing 
parties.213 
then the complaint should be dismissed. See, e.g., CoNNEcrICUT PRAcrICE BOOK 
§ 27F(d)-(g). Hence, pro se attorneys are protected from false claims of Rule 4.2 viola­
tions by requiring that opposing parties present reasonable grounds to believe that un­
authorized contact was made. 
Moreover, Pinsky illustrates the number of hurdles that should be overcome to 
pursue ethics violations against attorneys concerning Rule 4.2. See Pinsky v. Statewide 
Grievance Comm., 578 A.2d 1075, 1077 (Conn. 1990). The ex parte complaint in Pinsky 
was reviewed by four separate tribunals, all of which found the attorney innocent of any 
ethics violation. See id. The complaint was examined by a grievance panel, a reviewing 
committee, the state trial court, and ultimately the state high court. See id. Similarly, 
by requiring opposing parties to plead Rule 4.2 violations with particularity under 
looming shadows of preliminary investigations, grievance panels, reviewing committees, 
appellate tribunals, and possibly state supreme courts, these hurdles afford pro se law­
yers enough protection to insure that opposing parties do not wield an unfair "ethics" 
sword over attorneys proceeding pro se. 
In sum, the policy considerations supporting this Note's proposed rebuttable pre­
sumption standard advocate that attorneys do not engage in self-representation. How­
ever, such a standard does not lead to an absolute bar against attorney self­
representation in practice. First, pro se attorneys can protect themselves through au­
thorized ex parte contact. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 4.2. Secondly, pro se attorneys 
can protect themselves from false claims through grievance procedures requiring that 
opposing parties sufficiently prove their Rule 4.2 complaints, i.e., that there exists prob­
able cause to believe that unauthorized ex parte contact was made. See, e.g., Pinsky, 
578 A.2d at 1077; CoNNEcrICUT PRAcrICE BOOK § 27F. 
211. Certainly, "[i]t is a lofty goal to draft valuable ethical codes. It should not, 
however, be a goal that is easily abandoned." Green, supra note 28, at 288. 
Charles Wolfram notes that "[a] code of rules that is clear and fair can serve 
an important educational role by instructing receptive readers on what is con­
sidered right and wrong." Drafters of ethical codes, however, are not given 
free range to determine all ethical conduct. Drafters realize that any restric­
tion by the codes that attorneys find too intrusive upon the attorneys' goals to 
serve their clients and make money will be faced with open opposition and will 
not be followed. 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting WOLFRAM, supra note 5, at § 2.6.1); see also CENTER 
FOR PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANNOTATED 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT 402 (3d ed. 1996) (citing D.C. Bar, Legal 
Ethics Comm., Op. 258 (1995) (pro se lawyers may not communicate with represented 
opponents; pro se lawyers bring their professional skills and legal knowledge to the 
table and retain presumptively unfair advantage over opposing parties». 
212. See supra Part I.B for a discussion. of specific ethical obligations imposed 
upon lawyers. 
213. See, e.g., Kurlantzik, supra note 36, at 155. 
It would seem that these costs [in prohibiting direct communication] are not a 
very high price to pay for the benefits of the rule. Some of the costs might be 
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Some commentators advocate that direct communication be­
tween attorney-litigants and opposing parties may save time, 
money, and resources by avoiding the need to go through middle­
men.214 Additionally, overzealous, intimidating, or greedy repre­
sentation by retained counsel may hinder the administration of jus­
tice rather than expedite the legal process.2IS There may even be 
situations where the protection of Rule 4.2 is not needed, such as 
"circumstances in which attorney self-representation harms no one, 
does not interfere with the normal workings of the legal system and 
actually presents a better alternative to obtaining counsel."216 
For example, ex parte communication may have been benefi­
cial in the Sandstrom case.217 The pro se attorney-husband, if af­
forded an opportunity to show that he complied with his. ethical 
responsibilities, might have argued that he was not injuring any of 
the parties involved; indeed, communication between husband and 
wife may have alleviated some of the emotional pain associated 
with the divorce. The attorney might have argued that his contact 
did not interfere with the normal workings of the legal system and 
may have expedited the divorce proceedings.2IS Moreover, the at­
torney might have argued that the particular circumstances 
presented a better alternative to obtaining outside counsel because 
the parties could have settled their differences as husband and wife 
rather than attorney and litigant. 
Conversely, the court might have considered that the wife was 
a hospital patient when the attorney tried to contact her.219 The 
wife asserted that she asked her husband to talk with her attorney 
mitigated by better training and socialization of lawyers. In addition ... the 
rule contains some built-in flexibility ... the lawyer can judge in each case 
whether the rule's protection is required and whether it is in the client's inter­
est to engage in such communication. 
Id.; MODEL CoDE Preamble. "In fulfiUing his professional responsibilities, a lawyer 
necessarily assumes various roles that require the performance of many difficult tasks. 
Not every situation which he may encounter can be foreseen, but fundamental ethical 
principles are always:present to guide him." [d. 
214. See, e.g., Kurlantzik, supra note 36, at 154; Downey, supra note 4, at 551 
n.l97 (citing People ex reL Brazen v. Fmley, 497 N.E.2d 1013 (TIl. App. O. 1986), affd, 
519 N.E.2d 898 (TIl. 1988»; Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 578 A2d 1075 
(Conn. 1990). 
215. See Kurlantzik, supra note 36, at 154. 
216. Downey, supra note 4, at 556 (citing People ex reL Brazen v. Finley, 497 
N.E.2d 1013, 1017 (TIl. App. O. 1986»; see also Kurlantzik, supra note 36, at 154. 
217. See Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 1994). 
218. See Downey, supra note 4, at 556. 
219. See Sandstrom, 880 P.2d at 109. 
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about the divorce but the husband refused.220 Moreover, the court 
might have considered the surrounding circumstances associated 
with Mr. and Mrs. Sandstrom's particular divorce proceedings, e.g., 
whether the proceedings were relatively amicable or difficult. By 
allowing the attorney an opportunity to present arguments under a 
rebuttable presumption, the court could have weighed the benefits 
of ex parte communication in this case against the possible harm to 
the wife.221 Balancing.these interests would have allowed the court 
to protect both the independent interests of the attorney as a party 
to the matter and the interests of the wife, the court, and the public 
interest. 
Similarly, the attorney in Pinsky should have been afforded an 
opportunity to prove whether his ex parte contact satisfied the ethi­
cal requirements of objectivity, refraining from ·harassment, and 
avoiding·the appearance of impropriety.222 To rebut the presump­
tion that his conduct violated Rule 4.2, the attorney might first have 
argued that his' contact did not actually harm the interests of the 
opposing party; the attorney maintained objectivity.223 Secondly, 
the attorney might have argued that the possibility of any harm was 
nominal because all parties involved were sophisticated business lit­
igants; the attorney refrained from harassment.224 Finally, the at­
torney might have argued that his ex parte contact did not interfere 
with the normal workings of the legal system; the attorney avoided 
the appearance of impropriety.225 If the court determined that the 
attorney's conduct overcame the presumption of Rule 4.2's applica­
tion, then the attorney's ex parte contact was permissible.226 
Conversely, the court might have considered that the attor­
ney's ex parte contact occurred at the pnvate home of the opposing 
party.227 Moreover, the attorney never identified himself as an at­
220. See id. 
221. See supra Pan I.A for a discussion of the reasons why ex parte prohibitions 
are imposed despite the possible advantages gained through such contact. 
222. See generally Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 578 A.2d 1075 (Conn. 
1990). See supra notes 48-65 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the 
Pinsky case. 
223. See supra notes 119-141 and accompanying text for a discussion of attorneys' 
ethical requirement of objectivity. 
224. See supra notes 142-162 and accompanying text for a discussion of attorneys' 
ethical requirement of using the law for legitimate purposes and refraining from harass­
ing conduct. 
225. See supra notes 163-186 and accompanying text for Ii discussion of attorneys' 
ethical requirement of avoiding the appearance of impropriety. . 
226. See Pinsky, 578 A.2d at 1077-SO. 
227. See id. at 1076. 
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torney.228 Finally, the attorney threatened retaliatory legal ac­
·tion.229 These factors tend to undermine the attorney's obligations 
to objectivity, refraining from harassment, and avoiding the appear­
ance of impropriety.230 If the court determined that the attorney 
did not sufficiently show that he satisfied his ethical obligations, 
Rule 4.2 applied and the attorney was subject to sanctions.231 
Lawyers are representatives of clients, officers of the court, and 
public citizens having unique responsibilities to the quality of jus­
tice according to the Model Rules.232 The conflict between pro se 
lawyers' ethical obligations and their independent rights as parties 
to legal matters to communicate directly with opposing parties frus­
trates their service to the public interest and the proper administra­
tion of justice. "When attorneys in their professional capacity 
engage in conduct that is purely self-serving, they ... violate the 
obligations attending their role as public citizen. The resulting loss 
of faith by the public compromises the integrity of the legal profes­
sion, which the attorney has a duty to uphold.''233 When pro se 
lawyers communicate directly with opposing parties without proper 
authority or consent, pro se lawyers engage in self-serving con­
duct.234 Such self-serving conduct may violate the ethical require­
ments of objectivity, refraining from harassment, and avoiding the 
appearance of impropriety.23S 
Regardless of whether pro se attorneys are said to represent 
clients or not, the ethical obligations of objectivity, refraining from 
harassment, and avoiding the appearance of impropriety supporting 
the application of Rule 4.2 govern attorney conduct.236 Pro se at­
228. See id. 
229. See id. at 1CJ77. 
230. See supra notes 119-186 and accompanying text for a discussion of these 
attorney ethical obligations. 
231. See Pinsky, 578 A.2d at 1CJ78 (the court possesses inherent authority to regu­
late and discipline members of the bar). 
232. See MODEL RULES Preamble. 
233. Downey, supra note 4, at 540. 
234. See MODEL CoDE Preamble; MODEL RULES Preamble; MODEL CoDE EC 9­
6. 
Every lawyer owes a solemn duty to uphold the integrity and honor of his 
profession ... to conduct himself so as to reflect credit on the legal profession 
and to inspire the confidence, respect, and trust of his clients and of the public; 
and to strive to avoid not only professional impropriety but also the appear­
ance of impropriety. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
235. See generally MODEL RULES Preamble. 
236. See generally Downey, supra note 4 for a discussion of why ethical principles 
are applicable to pro se attorneys. 
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tomeys may lack objective legal judgment in contacting opposing 
parties.237 Pro se attorneys may be tempted to intimidate, harass, 
or manipulate opposing parties through ex parte contact.238 More­
over, pro se lawyers may give the impression. of impropriety by 
communicating with opposing parties without proper authority or 
consent.239 These self-serving practices violate obligations to the 
proper administration of justice.240 This in turn compromises the 
duty to maintain the integrity of the legal profession.241 
Hence, pro se attorneys should be subject to Rule 4.2 and gov­
erned by the ethical principles of objectivity, refraining from harass­
ment, and propriety except to the extent that courts shall determine 
when ex parte communications are in the interests of opposing par­
ties, the legal process, and do not undermine society's confidence or 
respect for the legal system.242 This standard recognizes the right of 
attorneys to self-representation and the independent rights enjoyed 
as parties to legal matters while embracing the ethical obligations 
lawyers must meet to uphold the integrity of the legal profession. 
CoNCLUSION 
Lawyers have the same right to proceed pro se as other indi­
vidual litigants. The right to self-representation is rooted in Ameri­
can history. Ethical lawyers, however, should be aware of the 
principles governing their conduct so as not to violate professional 
237. See, e.g., Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991); White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. 
Corp., 614 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1980); Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1958). 
See generally Downey, supra note 4, at 543-46. 
238. See, e.g., Schild v. Rubin, 232 Cal. App. 3d 755 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Fox v. 
Boucher, 794 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1986); Downey, supra note 4, at 547-48; McLaughlin, 
supra note 21, at 1109 n.4; Burke, supra note 21, at 1639; Nichols, supra note 21, at 351 
n.3 (listing cases in which pro se litigants harassed opponents and wasted court 
resources). 
239. See supra note 163 for comments concerning the cynicism held toward 
lawyers. 
240. See generally MODEL RULES Preamble. 
241. See Brill, supra note 163, at 86. 
I submit that the only reason that we lawyers have licenses granting us the 
exclusive right to practice law is to provide us with an opportunity to serve our 
clients. We must never lose sight of this principle and we must always do our 
best to serve them-for if we do not, other groups will rush in to provide 
services demanded by our former clients. 
H, through our greed or neglect or inefficiency, we fail to serve the public, 
we will deserve to lose our exclusive franchises to provide legal services .... 
Id. 
242. "Ethical [standards] should be a resource that [attorneys] can consult to find 
explicit guidance regarding ethical and moral obligations." Green, supra note 28, at 
289. 
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obligations to the legal system. Pro se attorneys may harm their 
cases by an inability to remain objective. Moreover, some attorney 
actions appear self-serving, resulting in the loss of faith by the pub­
lic. This compromises the integrity of the profession. 
Unfortunately, the rules governing attorney conduct are silent 
concerning the ethics of attorney self-representation. Indeed, Rule 
4.2 seems to assume the existence of attorney-client relationships 
between separate individuals. Further, whether Rule 4.2 applies to 
pro se attorneys is left unanswered by the courts' various interpre­
tations. In response to this uncertainty, this Note presents a 
straightforward approach to resolve the 'problem. 
Whether pro se attorneys represent clients or not is irrelevant 
in determining the applicability of Rule 4.2. Pro se attorneys who 
communicate about legal matters with opposing parties may engage 
in self-serving conduct. Such conduct violates the ethical standards 
of objectivity, refraining from harassment, and avoiding the appear­
ance of impropriety. Such conduct thwarts the legal profession's 
ethical aspirations to serve the public interest. Additionally, self­
serving conduct violates the duty to the proper administration of 
justice. This compromises the obligation to maintain the integrity 
of the legal profession and is unethical. Unethical attorney self-rep­
resentation injures not only attorneys and opposing parties, but also 
the legal process and the public's confidence in the legal system. 
Pro se attorneys must be subject to the same ethical concerns 
as other attorneys in order to maintain high professional principles 
while promoting the integrity of their profession., The standard pro­
posed by this Note recognizes the right of attorneys to self-repre­
sentation and the independent rights enjoyed as parties to legal 
matters while embracing the ethical obligations lawyers have to up­
hold the integrity of the legal profession. Hence, pro se attorneys 
should be governed by Rule 4.2 and the ethical principles of objec­
tivity, refraining from harassment, and propriety except to the ex­
tent courts shall determine when ex parte communications are in 
the interests of opposing parties, the legal process, and do not un­
dermine society's confidence or respect for the legal system. Com­
pliance with Rule 4.2 assures the proper administration of justice 
and upholds society's trust and confidence in the legal system. 
Stephen J. Langs 
